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International Constitutionalism 
 
Jan Klabbers1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
International law has always been conceived as a project involving sovereign and 
equal states, who would be forever locked in battle with each other – if not 
literally, then at least metaphorically. The international legal order, such as it is, 
was always conceptualized as a horizontal order, mostly geared towards 
facilitating the co-existence of states, and with scant attention for planetary 
unity, or even for the interests of individual human beings. International law was 
made by states, to regulate relations between states, and for the benefit of states. 
What happened within those states was long considered anathema, and nothing 
was supposed to exist above those states.  
If this has always and invariably been the dominant strand in conceptualizations 
of the global legal order, eventually to be confirmed by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in some of its classic decisions, individual thinkers through 
the ages have nonetheless occasionally dared to dream of something bigger. 
Grotius, for one, dreamt of collective security, of a legal order that would 
distinguish between just and unjust wars and collectively punish the wrongdoer. 
Christian Wolff posited the existence of a civitas maxima, a world government 
with authority over states. Immanuel Kant, worried about the possible tyrannical 
side of world government, posited a confederation of republics as the recipe for 
eternal peace, a stand which at least presupposes peace as a legitimate telos for 
the society of states, as opposed to the proto-Darwinian (or Hobbesian) struggle 
of all against all.2 
But such dreams notwithstanding, for all practical purposes international law 
long remained a system of rules created by, between and for equals enjoying the 
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status of sovereignty, serving no higher goals than the peaceful (if at all possible) 
coexistence between those same states. Some may have identified a connection 
to the domestic law of those states, and Wolfgang Friedmann may have famously 
posited that the law of co-existence was in the process of being joined by a law of 
co-operation3, but until the late 1960s, early 1970s, these changes were little 
more than window-dressing.  
During the 1960s, however, some states started to think that there might be 
some norms which were simply intransgressible, and formalized this into the 
idea of jus cogens norms: some norms exist from which no derogation is 
permitted.4 The International Court of Justice added, in 1970, the idea that there 
exist norms which affect the legal interests of all states: these give rise to so-
called erga omnes obigations.5 And less than a decade later, people had started to 
think it might be possible to distinguish between state torts and state crimes.6 It 
never became very clear what either of these developments meant, and the tort-
crime distinction rather rapidly proved difficult to operationalize, but somehow 
the seeds had been planted. Jus cogens norms, erga omnes obligations, and state 
crimes, they all presuppose something of a hierarchical, vertical element in the 
order that had traditionally been made up of sovereign equals, and had been 
based on the consent of those sovereign equals. 
These seeds would come to fruition for a brief period, roughly the first decade of 
the new millenium, with many proclaiming the constitutionalization of 
international law, either as an ontological reality or at least as a desideratum. 
For about a decade, the putative constitutionalization of international law 
captured the interests of international lawyers – for reasons to be discussed, 
below, in section II. Sections III to VI discuss different manifestations of thinking 
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about constitutionalization; section VII provides a view of the field after the 
smoke has cleared, while section VIII concludes.   
 
II. The Setting 
 
Perhaps inspired by millennial Angst, during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century many international lawyers explored the possibilities of and for 
international constitutionalism. The reasons for doing so were varied and 
manifold. For some, constitutionalism was merely the obvious next step, 
following the fall of the Wall and the proclaimed ‘end of history’: a liberal world 
order required, or mandated, a liberal international constitutional order, and 
with human rights and democracy firmly in place - or so it seemed from a 
Western European vantage point, a good few years before Trump and Erdogan - 
it made sense to complete the Enlightenment project: global peace through a 
global constitutional order. There may have been faint echoes of 1950s rallying 
cries here (‘world peace through world law’), but nonetheless, if ever, this was 
the moment. 
Others, more pragmatic perhaps, saw in constitutionalism a response to the 
much-feared image of the fragmentation of international law: if the domains of 
international law were becoming increasingly independent and international 
environmental lawyers could no longer communicate with international trade 
lawyers, then something was required to bind them together, and what could be 
more obvious and beneficial than international constitutionalism? In an 
international constitutional order, trade law and environmental law would both 
be part of the same overarching system and, so the argument implicitly 
continued, both be subject to the higher goals of the international community – 
although what exactly those higher goals were was usually, wisely perhaps, left 
unspecified. 
And for yet others, worried about the risks and dangers posed by unfettered 
globalization, constitutionalism provided something of a political response: if 
globalization was ideology, used to sell political projects of exploitation to 
influential Western elites, then something of a counter-ideology was required, 
and constitutionalism could fit the bill. 
The story of international constitutionalism can be told in a variety of ways, but 
it is important to realize that there is no constitutionalization going on without a 
story, a larger narrative that places disjointed occurrences into a single coherent 
whole. One way to tell the story is to focus on concrete legal developments: the 
emergence of notions such as jus cogens norms or erga omnes obligations in 
international case-law; or the rise of human rights after the Second World War; 
or the post-war mushrooming of international organizations and multilateral 
agreements; or the increase in the number of international courts and tribunals 
since the 1990s. All of these can be seen as markers of constitutionalism for 
those wishing to see them as such; indeed, jus cogens becomes a feature of 
constitutionalism only for those who look at the world through constitutionalist 
lenses; those who refuse to don such spectacles may think of jus cogens as an 
aberration, or as a harbinger of future developments, or even simply as political 
correctness.7  
This suggests that much depends on how international constitutionalization is 
conceptualized by proponents and discontents alike. There is no single, generally 
agreed and accepted notion of international constitutionalization available: 
instead, it seems that every author has used his or her (surprisingly often her, 
given the still overwhelmingly male composition of international law academia) 
own vocabulary, based on his or her own insights and intuitions and background 
understandings – not to mention his or her own value-systems. Hence, the 
current chapter discusses those authorial interpretations, not so much to search 
for common denominators, but rather in order to highlight what international 
constitutionalization was, and is, and could be, all about. This also entails that I 
am hard-pressed to adopt standard definitions: much depends, after all, on how 
various authors have employed various terms. Nonetheless, I will generally 
distinguish between the material process of constitutionalization and the idea of 
constitutionalism. 
International constitutionalization and constitutionalism manifested themselves 
predominantly in four broad strands in the literature. First, there were those 
who observed or endorsed constitutionalization as a process, taking place in 
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international law broadly conceived, and in various ways – I will refer to them as 
the cosmopolitans. A second group thought of constitutionalization primarily in 
connection with specific international organizations: the institutionalists. A third 
group shifted attention away from full constitutionalization to a more modest 
and less demanding strand, concentrating on administrative control and, in the 
process, filling a gap curiously left wide open by most constitutionalist 
proposals: few of these proposals occupied themselves meaningfully with 
control of public authority. For this group I coin the neologism administrativists. 
Finally, some proved more skeptical, and suggested that full-fledged 
constitutionalization might not work or would be undesirable (or both), but 
nonetheless borrowed elements deemed normatively commendable – the 
skeptics. In what follows, I will discuss these four strands, mindful of the 
circumstance that boundaries between the various groups of authors were 
porous and fluid, so much so that some authors – including myself - can be 
placed in more than one group. I will finish by taking stock of what is left of the 
debate, for a curious characteristic is that it seems to have disappeared just as 
rapidly as it burst on the scene - the intellectual equivalent of a one-hit wonder. 
On the other hand, it is not impossible that while it has changed its colours and 
its tone, something of a constitutionalization debate still persists. 
 
III. The Cosmopolitans 
 
It is no exaggeration to state most of the international lawyers writing about 
constitutionalism displayed strong liberal sensitivities. For the likes of Mattias 
Kumm, Erika de Wet and Anne Peters, for all their differences, 
constitutionalization has something to do with human rights, with democracy, 
with rule of law and, for De Wet, also with the market economy. International 
constitutionalization is also, it seems, a peculiarly German affliction, and has 
been especially noted in precisely its German manifestations. While others, from 
other traditions, have written approvingly about international 
constitutionalization, their work has been less influential, and markedly different 
in tone.8 
There are, one would think, at least three reasons for this Germanic orientation. 
One is the legacy of the Nazi era, which inspired post-war German international 
lawyers to adopt a strong liberal orientation. Second, in the absence of a central 
authority in international law, much of the systematizing in that discipline needs 
to be done by law professors – and this dovetails nicely with the German 
tradition of systematization by dogmatic scholarship. Third, Germany’s legal 
academia has traditionally had a strong public law orientation, and 
constitutionalization thus fell into a fertile tradition; recent antecedents can be 
detected in the works of Verdross going back to the 1930s9, but also in Mosler’s 
conception of the international community as a legal community rather than, as 
many non-German contemporaries would have it, an anarchical society.10 Even 
Kelsen can be seen as a forerunner: his monism, characterized by the supremacy 
of international law, hinged on a conception of a global community able to 
delegate tasks to states and others, and was inspired, as Jochen von Bernstorff 
has so compellingly shown, by his social-democratic liberalism.11  
Following this strong tradition, perhaps the pater familias of millennarian 
constitutionalism was Christian Tomuschat, whose 1999 lectures to the Hague 
Academy set the tone.12 These lectures were devoted to the survival of mankind, 
and imbued with an anxiety that could only be relieved by global liberal thought. 
In addition, Tomuschat wrote and edited tomes about human rights protection 
by international authorities – which in itself can be seen as a manifestation of 
constitutionalism – as well as about supreme norms – another manifestation. 
Tomuschat therewith constructed a careful edifice of a constitutional legal order, 
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with certain norms for the protection of the individual at the apex, as norms 
from which no derogation was permitted. All of this, of course, had been floating 
around for a few decades already, but Tomuschat was arguably the first to 
systematize and place it in a constitutionalist framework. 
Still, other German international lawyers (Bruno Simma, Jochen Frowein, 
Rüdiger Wolfrum, Jost Delbrück) followed suit, or worked on the basis of similar 
premises, even if they did not always use the constitutionalist vocabulary. Even 
those outside the discipline of international law would come to discuss 
international constitutionalism in one way or another. This applied, for instance, 
to individuals working in the private law tradition: Christian Joerges posited that 
private law could exercise constitutional values and functions, while Gunther 
Teubner used constitutionalism as a prism for discussions of functionally 
differentiated regimes. Constitutional lawyers too, such as the above-mentioned 
Kumm, rather naturally extended the reach of their domestic domain to 
international affairs, and as we will see, even the renowned philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas came to embrace international constitutionalism. 
But possibly the most discussed versions of constitutionalism stemmed from two 
female authors13, Erika de Wet and Anne Peters, in two articles published almost 
simultaneously and, while related, with some crucial differences. De Wet 
possibly qualifies as the most outspoken proponent of constitutionalism or, as 
she would say at the time, the constitutionalization of international law.14 For 
her, constitutionalization was not a mental structure or a normative project (not 
just a political dogma) but empirically observable reality – a process that could 
be, and ought to be, identified: her seminal article confidently discusses the 
international constitutional order as ontological reality, without question 
mark.15 
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Still, for all the confidence of the article, both the premises and the theory could 
be scrutinized. In particular her catalogue of human rights was question-begging 
in its embrace of the market economy: while she no doubt had a point in 
insisting on the prohibition of torture being widely recognized as a human right, 
the same could not be said about the right to contract, or the right to engage in 
trade and commerce. Rights these may be, but they are not necessarily 
recognized as part of any  human rights catalogue, and neither do they carry the 
same normative expectations as the prohibition of torture – or, put differently: if 
human rights flow from human dignity, the connection to the torture prohibition 
is a lot easier to make than to freedom of contract or the right to trade. These 
rights flowed straight from the ordo-liberal hymn-sheet, tapping into a kind of 
liberalism briefly popular in the interbellum and the years immediately 
following the Second World War, but rarely endorsed in this particular form. In 
the end, then, De Wet’s constitutionalization thesis found itself at the more 
extreme end of the political spectrum: read and referred to by many, but not 
generally considered persuasive.16 
The work of Anne Peters, by contrast, possesses more traction. The main thrust 
of Peters’ brand of constitutionalism emphasized democracy. In a classic piece, 
published the same year as De Wet’s17, she suggested strongly that 
constitutionalism is leaking away at the domestic level – meaning in particular, if 
not exclusively, that democratic control in the nation-state was no longer viable 
if decision-making was transferred to international levels. Hence, this leak 
needed to meet with a response: compensatory constitutionalism. But, as she 
elaborated a few years later18, this was not a matter of either/or: in fact, there 
ought to be, as she called it, a system of ‘dual democracy’: democracy both 
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domestic and on the international level. And what is more, this is not mere ‘ideal 
theory’ but, instead, is slowly but surely materializing. Non-democratic decision-
making suffers from a legitimacy deficit that its output, no matter how useful or 
welcome, cannot compensate for. 
Peters has a point, both on normative and empirical grounds – it is difficult to 
argue against democracy, on any level of decision-making. Indeed, some might 
think that her fondness of democracy is too limiting: carving a particular, thin 
concept in stone, makes it more difficult for thicker concepts of democracy to 
rise to prominence.19 
If De Wet made a strong empirical claim, a more overtly normative version of 
international constitutionalization was posited by Kumm.20  For him, the 
domestic legitimation of international law was no longer fully available, and thus 
needed to be replaced by an international constitutional framework. To this end, 
he posited that the legitimacy of international law would be enhanced through 
four principles: formal legitimacy (legality), procedural legitimacy (subsidiarity), 
procedural legitimacy (participation and accountability) and output legitimacy 
(achieving reasonable outcomes). In doing so he anticipated the work of what I 
refer to below as the administrativists, although not by much and possibly not by 
happenstance: being, like some of them, based at New York University may have 
sensitized him to the need to address in particular participation and 
acountability in a constitutionalist framework, something that in particular De 
Wet had never emphasized. 
Kumm’s approach was also different in another way: he was not interested in 
sketching an international constitutional order, but rather in sketching and 
justifying constitutionalism beyond the state – and this was how he explicitly 
presented his project, thinking of the legal setting not as one with strictly 
separated ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ spheres, but rather as overlapping and 
cross-cutting ‘legal practices’. In this sense, as I will argue below, he also 
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foreshadowed more current manifestations of international 
constitutionalization, which take the existence of overlapping legal spaces as 
their starting point. 
 
IV. The Institutionalists 
a. The EU 
 
If one might think that constitutionalization of the international order is, well, a 
tall order, there might be solace in looking forward to the constitutionalization of 
bits and pieces thereof, and typically, such is operationalized by looking at 
specific international organizations. This is not a particularly German affectation, 
although Germans have played a prominent role here as well, and quite possibly 
the first to approach the matter had fled from German occupation of his native 
Czechoslovakia: Eric Stein. Stein wrote what must have been the first piece on 
the constitutionalization of the EU (then still the EEC), noting that the Court of 
Justice of that organization played a strong constitutional role: it had posited that 
EU law was directly effective in the member states; that EU law was superior to 
member state national law; and that the EU could boast implied powers in the 
external sphere. All this added up to far more than a regular international 
organization.21 
Stein was right, of course, although one may question whether the process he 
observed was well-served by referring to it as ‘constitutionalization’. In a sense, 
this unmasked the poverty of the legal-political vocabulary, itself reflective of the 
limited nature of political imagination. The EU was constitutionalizing in that it 
could no longer plausibly be regarded as a mere contractual undertaking 
between fully independent member states (even if the member states are 
generally thought to remain, in ironic German, Herren der Verträge), but its 
constitutional structure showed fairly little resemblance to that of the 
constitutional state – Stein’s interest was in describing the solidification of the 
EU rather than discussing controls on exectuve authority or other staples of 
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constitutional thought – and that suggests a radically different notion of 
‘constitutionalization’. 
What is more, in this limited sense a great many international organizations can 
be considered ‘constitutional’: in many international organizations, the executive 
organ plays a role of its own, and in many, the accepted sphere of action includes 
implied powers. Still, it would be decidedly unorthodox to pin the label 
‘constitutional’ on, say, the Universal Postal Union, or the International Olive 
Council, or the European University Institute. 
Nonetheless, a lively and long-lasting debate ensued on how constitutional the 
EU was, and whether it should have a formal constitution, and whether such a 
constitution could take the form of a treaty between member states to begin 
with.22 More to the point though, some started to investigate whether other 
organizations could somehow be seen as constitutional, and attention focused on 
two such organizations: the newly created World Trade Organization, and the 
well-established United Nations. 
 
b. The WTO 
The constitutionalization of the WTO had been posited, in various ways and, it 
seems, varying degrees, by seasoned trade lawyers such including Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann.23 Ordo-liberal in outlook, he based himself on the integrative 
workings of the CJEU, which had observed that the right to trade and the right to 
contract were fundamental rights. These now were exemplified most of all in the 
WTO. Hence, an argument could be made that the WTO was protecting and 
stimulating fundamental rights and, ergo, could thus be seen as a constitutional 
order, however embryonic perhaps. It would, moreover, also deliver the goods 
associated with (ordo-)liberal constitutionalism: the WTO, by insisting on the 
freedom to trade and contract, would increase global welfare, and that would be 
good for everyone. As the slogan goes: a rising tide lifts all boats. 
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It was here, naturally, that critics started to object: a rising tide may lift all boats, 
but the analogy is deceptive, in that some boats are likely to be lifted higher than 
others. All legal rules and institutions have distributive effects, and 
Petersmann’s, so it was feared, would rapidly make the rich richer and the poor 
poorer. His outlook was unmasked as blatantly free-market oriented, with little 
regard for other values that some may deem constitutional: solidarity, equality, 
or the entire catalogue of social and economic rights. Plus, there remained the 
unanswered question as to who would be responsible for the 
constitutionalization process. The most obvious candidate would be the WTO’s 
member states (these were Herren des Vertrags, after all), but this seemed 
unlikely: if so, they could have created a constitutional order from the start, 
rather than set in motion a process. Moreover, a large number of those member 
states cannot claim internally to be liberal, or democratic, or even much more 
than nominally market-oriented, and the accession of China and Russia would do 
little to change this.  
Hence, one would have to look elsewhere for the engine of the 
constitutionalization process, and in a pioneering article Deborah Cass suggested 
that this engine consisted of the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO: its 
panels and especially its highest judicial organ, the Appellate Body.24 Yet, upon 
closer scrutiny, Cass retreated considerably: in her monograph published a few 
years25 later she took distance from her earlier views, and suggested that there 
was not all that much constitutionalization going on in the WTO. Much of this 
change of heart stemmed from having adopted a different, more comprehensive 
and demanding, notion of constitutionalization. If the earlier article assumed 
constitutionalization as a means for addressing some particular concerns 
(including the WTO’s own position), the later monograph viewed 
constitutionalization more on a par with domestic constitutional thought, 
highlighting such issues as inclusiveness of participation, political community, 
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and deliberation. And on such a conception, there is all of a sudden a lot less 
constitutionalization visible in the WTO. 
 
c. The United Nations 
The most well-known version of organizational constitutionalism is, in fact, a 
combination of the institutional and cosmopolitan versions. The German scholar 
Bardo Fassbender, currently a law professor at St. Gallen in Switzerland, 
published a famous piece in 1998 in which he suggested, invoking the German 
tradition, that the UN Charter was best seen as constitution for the international 
community.26 The claim therewith contains two distinct sub-claims, although 
these remained largely implicit: first, that the international order has a 
constitution, known as the UN Charter; and second, the claim includes the sub-
claim that the UN, as an organization, must be viewed as constitutional.  
Fassbender’s argument was picked up and endorsed by none other than 
Habermas27, and indeed it contains a few plausible elements. Thus, if the 
hallmark of constitutions is that they are hierarchically superior to ordinary law, 
the same applies to the Charter, by virtue of the supremacy clause of article 103. 
And if constitutions usually apply to all within the same political community, 
article 2(6) of the Charter displays a similar ambition, although in terms more 
guarded than Fassbender suggests perhaps: the provision calls upon the 
cooperation of third parties, but does not (and cannot) order such cooperation. 
On other points, Fassbender’s claim was less plausible, even within its own four 
corners. For instance, the suggestion that the drafters of the Charter chose the 
term Charter precisely because it referred to a constitution and no similar term 
was available, is historically untenable. If nothing else, they could have just 
referred to their instrument as a ‘constitution’, without needing to resort to the 
term ‘charter’ – indeed, the constitutive instruments of some other organizations 
are called ‘constitution’; the World Health Organization, a contemporary of the 
UN, is an example. 
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More important though than these cosmetics is how Fassbender conceptualized 
his constitution. It turned out that Fassbender’s constitution does little by way of 
separation of powers and says nothing at all about the accountability of the UN 
and any of its organs. If one of the functions of a constitution is to place limits on 
the exercise of public power, as many would agree, then the UN Charter à la 
Fassbender is a very, very relaxed example of constitution: it does not limit the 
UN’s activities in any way and, on at least one reading of the Charter, does not 
even limit the scope of activities of the supreme international public organ, the 
Security Council. In the end, then, Fassbender’s constitutionalism is in effect a 
hyper-functional concept28, allowing the UN to do as it pleases, without placing 
any limits on the scope and reach of public power. And if the UN were deemed 
constitutional in theory, one cannot escape the practical observation that much 
of what it does would be difficult to reconcile with any version of 
constitutionalist thought: if the UN is considered to be ‘constitutional’, one can 
only reach the conclusion that much of what does is actually ‘unconstitutional’ – 
and how helpful is that?  
 
V. The Administrativists 
 
As transpired from the above, most versions of international constitutionalism 
suffered from two major blind spots. First, much constitutional thought was 
modeled, explicitly or implicitly, on Western values. That is not surprising, of 
course; it would be much more surprising if Western scholars would not reflect 
Western values. It would be problematic if the Western-born plans would result 
in global domination, yet that is something that is less easily demonstrated. The 
critique that such projects are neo-colonial or Western-dominated is a bit facile, 
but it does have bite – politically, such allegations are often enough to kill off any 
ambitions a project may have. 
Second though, and much more surprising given the usual associations that come 
with the term ‘constitution’, few of the constitutionalist proposals pay much 
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attention to the control of public authority. Yet, if there is one single normative 
element to constitutionalism, it is the idea that public power should be kept in 
check: this is the hallmark of one of the foundational texts of constitutionalism, 
the Federalist Papers.29 A constitution, in other words, is expected to include 
provisions on the organization of public power, and therewith also on limits on 
the exercise of public power – even if only in terms of a separation of powers. 
Yet, as noted, much of the constitutional discourse related to specific 
international organizations was geared towards solidifying the position of the 
institution in question, while the more general constitutional discourse of the 
cosmopolitans posited the existence of universal values (with greater or lesser 
cogency) but, in most versions, was never explicit about controlling public 
power. Peters’ work, with its emphasis on democracy, comes closest, but at best 
represents an important exception rather than the rule. Thus, one might say that 
international constitutionalism collapsed under its own weıght: it posited a 
universalizing project, while closing its eyes for the one thing that would have fit 
such a universalizing project. 
Perhaps in response, several projects aimed to play down constitutionalism’s 
‘conceits’30 and relied on an administrative law approach instead. This had two 
distinct advantages (at least) over international constitutionalism, or so it 
seemed. First, being administrative in nature, it never needed to demonstrate the 
universality of big political values. All it needed to do was to suggest the 
universality of certain procedural ideas: the idea that decisions should be 
reasoned; or the idea that all relevant stakeholders should participate in 
decision-making affecting them; or the idea that decisions should be 
proportional. And this, so proponents thought, was much easier to achieve than 
agreement on whether or not torture would be acceptable in extreme 
circumstances, or where the limits of free speech should lie. And second, being 
administrative in nature, it would automatically be concerned (so it was 
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thought) with the control of public power, and perhaps even the control of some 
manifestations of private power as well.31  
For ease of reference, two versions will be distinguished. The first became 
known as global administrative law, and was developed by international lawyers 
such as Benedict Kingsbury and Nico Krisch, in conjunction with administrative 
lawyers, including Richard Stewart and Sabino Cassese.32 It worked on the basis 
of the posited existence of a global legal space (empirically verifiable), in which 
decisions are taken which thus (or so it seemed to follow) ought to be subject to 
some kind of review. These decisions could emanate from public authorities, 
local as well as international: refugee applications, e.g., can be handled both by 
domestic authorities and by UNHCR. Sometimes, pertinent decisions can even 
emanate from private authorities, at least in those cases where private 
authorities assume public or semi-public functions, or their standards have been 
adopted by public authority. Thus, GAL scholars have paid attention to private 
certification schemes as well as to the work of, e.g. international sports bodies. 
A second approach was pioneered in Heidelberg, at the Max Planck Institute for 
Foreign Public and International Law, under the heading of International Public 
Authority (IPA).33 Here, the scope was more restrictive: IPA concentrated on 
public institutions, and aimed to develop a framework for understanding the 
standard-setting activities of these international institutions, on the basis of the 
observation that much of this work is done through governance that may not 
utilize specifically legal instruments, and therewith may escape legal scrutiny. 
Hence, IPA tried to reconstruct international public governance in public law 
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terms (often borrowed from administrative law), with the ambition to highlight 
control.34 
While GAL in particular proved a hugely popular and successful academic 
project, not all of its ambitions could be met. For one thing, the posited 
distinction between procedure and substance, used to justify a procedural 
perspective, proved difficult to sustain. Proportionality testing, e.g., always 
involves a substantive choice: something must be tested against something else, 
and the choice for the ‘something else’ can have huge political effects. Likewise, it 
is one thing to claim that decision-making should include the relevant 
stakeholders, but the choice for the relevant stakeholders in any given procedure 
is never politically innocent either. Here too, the neo-colonial critique reared its 
head: the administrative notions relied on were often borrowed from the US or 
the EU, so how universal were they really? Plus, even the premise proved 
problematic: for Anglo-saxons, administrative law may function so as to limit 
public authority; but for some civil law traditions, it functions rather to empower 
public authority. In response, GAL scholars have done much to clarify what they 
mean by ‘public’ and even what they mean by ‘law’, and have further investigated 
different techniques of governance, including in particular governance that does 
not rely on standard instruments (regulations, directives) but instead takes place 
through indicators.35 
And then there is the circumstance that if one of the inspirations for re-
introducing public law thinking into international law resided in the perceived 
fragmentation of international law, the administrative approaches do little to 
overcome fragmentation. GAL works best when it comes to applying norms from 
a single regime – in such circumstances, proportionality (for instance) may make 
some sense. But it makes less sense when norms from different regimes are cast 
against each other, and that is precisely where guidance is mostly needed. How 
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can one decide proportionally between trade and the environment? Or between 
security and human rights?36 
 
VI. The Skeptics 
 
Some of the pitfalls of international constitutionalism were discovered early 
enough: thus, it was observed that the constitutionalization of different regimes 
or organizations would only serve so as to deepen political cleavages: instead of 
pitting rule against rule, it would pit constitution against constitution, therewith 
making any compromise that much harder to achieve. 
The skeptics can, by and large, be divided into two groups, with some 
overlapping membership, on the basis of whether they look for alternatives 
within the law or outside of it. Both groups accept that the world is highly 
pluralist, not merely normatively, in that people may endorse different agendas, 
but epistemological as well. We do not mean the same things even if we use the 
same terms, let alone that we can agree on anything substantive. For some, such 
as Nico Krisch, this meant that lawyers would have to reach ‘beyond 
constitutionalism’, and would need to try and devise methods of settling conflicts 
within and between functional regimes. In a pluralist world, conflicts between 
norms or regimes would demand a political solution, and the law ought to do as 
much as possible to facilitate such a solution.37 Klabbers, in turn, aimed to posit a 
sources-doctrine for a constitutional global order: under what circumstances can 
a constitutional global order accept normative utterances as law?38 In order to 
achieve this, he suggested a ‘presumptive positivism’: normative utterances 
should be regarded as (international) law unless the reverse could be 
demonstrated. 
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Others, however, doubted whether the law could do much work here, although 
they accepted that much of the work to be done was to be done by lawyers, 
utilizing their expertise when acting in a decision-making capacity. It followed, 
that much would come to depend on how those individuals would come to utilize 
their expertise. Koskenniemi suggested that the one thing worth saving from a 
duty-based constitutionalism was the mindset: lawyers ought to realize that 
when making decisions, they ought to mindful of the effects of their actions, and 
give effect to a ‘culture of formalism’.39 
Klabbers had likewise suggested, early on, that the most proper 
constitutionalism would be a ‘constitutionalism lite’40, and later fleshed this out 
more explicitly in terms borrowed from Aristotelian virtue ethics. This approach 
accepts the premise that the application of legal rules always involves a human 
element: rules do not decide on their own application, or how they shall be 
interpreted, or whether the exception is applicable – all this involves human 
intervention, and thus there is merit in thinking about what sort of individual 
gets to apply the law. It may make a difference, for instance, beyond differences 
in technical competence, whether legal officers are courageous or not, humble or 
not, or honest or not, even if notions of honesty or humility or courage may differ 
across time and space. And emphatically, it may matter whether they are 
compassionate, or display empathy.41 
 
VII. The Current State of Affairs 
 
After the broad and intense debates in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, the discussion on international constitutionalism seems to have calmed 
down considerably. Looking back, it seemed that the debate received several 
final contributions in the forms of a volume edited by Tsagourias, a study by 
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Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein and a volume edited by Dunoff and Trachtman42, 
after which the caravan of international lawyers moved on to different matters, 
symbolized in the title of Krisch’s work: Beyond Constitutionalism. And once the 
caravan had moved on, it became time to reflect not on constitutionalization 
itself, but on the debate that had taken place: several of the post-2009 
contributions aimed to make sense first and foremost of that debate.43 To the 
extent that the debate itself is still engaged in, it seems to have been taken over 
by political theorists.44 
Perhaps the parochial, Western foundations espoused by many international 
constitutionalists has come to place constitutionalism in a bad light; perhaps the 
belated discovery by international lawyers of a principle of systemic integration, 
laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, has eased many 
worries about the fragmentation of international law; perhaps the rejection by 
Dutch and Frech electorates of the EU constitution has slowed down the 
discussion even in EU circles (note though that much of the rejected 
constitutional treaty has found its way, uncontroversially, in the Lisbon Treaty: a 
constitution in all but name); and if it is true, as it seems, that globalization is less 
popular these days, it stands to reason that there is less need for an antidote in 
the form of international constitutionalism. 
That said, international constitutionalism has not disappeared altogether, but it 
does appear to have changed some of its colours. Perhaps the most remarkable 
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development has been the creation of  two relevant journals.45 The first of these 
is the International Journal of Constitutional Law, first published in 2003 and 
especially inspired by the dual circumstance that constitutional norms were 
globalizing and comparative constitutional law was considered to be on the rise. 
Its editorial policy does not sharply distinguish, as it could have done, between 
the internationalization of constitutional law on the one hand and the 
constitutionalization of international law on the other hand, and neither does the 
more recently created, and intimately related, International Society of Public 
Law.  
The second and more specifically dedicated journal is titled Global 
Constitutionalism, edited by an interdisciplinary mix of lawyers and political 
scientists. Remarkably, the latter journal saw the light not at the crest of the 
constitutionalist wave, but when the wave had already receded, in 2012, and this 
circumstance alone suggests that there is something fundamental about 
international constitutionalization that renders it more than just another 
academic fad or fashion. 
That ‘something’, however, does not appear to be anything grandiose such as the 
putative constitutionalization of the international legal order. Instead, perusing 
the table of contents of the journal suggests it focuses on the philosophical 
niceties of global constitutionalism, and on comparative constitutional law and 
politics. There is fairly little talk in its pages about jus cogens, hierarchy or, 
indeed, globalization; but quite a bit of attention for developments in Turkey or 
Colombia, and for what theorists mean when they speak of ‘the people’, or of 
‘judicial review’. And this suggests the making of a second wave, smaller perhaps 
and less ambitious than its predecessor, but possibly longer-lasting. 
This makes sense, if only because, appearances notwithstanding, some of the 
problems that inspired the earlier wave of scholarship have continued to persist. 
Public power is still exercised on a transnational level, beyond the reach of most 
national parliamentarians, and often escaping the reach of judicial organs as 
well. Private power, moreover, often uses public authorities for its own 
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purposes, again often unimpeded, and public authorities outsource tasks to 
private actors, therewith redistributing social and economic capital.  
And to the extent that international constitutionalism owed much to the 
emergence of the individual – or humanity – as independent carrier of rights and 
obligations under international law46, legal issues can be expected to multiply. 
Put differently, when the legal position of a specific individual is affected by rules 
coming from different sources and saying different things, some device is needed 
to decide the situation –and that device can no longer be simpy the claim that 
one jurisdiction applies and the other does not, or the claim that one is superior 
to the other. Even if technically that may be the case, deciding cases  by technical 
competence without taking the individual concerned into account is no longer 
fully acceptable. This is, ultimately, the main lesson (one of many, to be sure) of 
the Kadi case before the CJEU: it suggests that doing justice in individual cases is 
becoming an inherent element of legal decision-making across boundaries – and 
this, if anything, may well be characterized as a form of ‘constitutionalization 
from below’ and driven by incidental litigation rather than grand design.47 
Additionally, even if the vocabulary of constitutionalization is no longer fully 
applied, there remains the strongly felt need to provide global public goods and 
common goods, ranging from putting a stop to climate change to such things as 
peace and security, and in these matters the traditional international law 
vocabulary revolving around state consent is clearly not up to the task. Hence, 
something else is needed, and that something else may well be a different 
manifestation of constitutionalism, however ‘light’ perhaps.48 
 
VIII. To Conclude 
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International law lacks central authorities, and thus the task of systematizing 
what otherwise seem like random events and creations falls upon academics. 
Yet, the absence of central authority also suggests the absence of any specific 
authorial intent: it is left to international lawyers, or more specifically 
international law academics, to make sense of what goes on around them. This 
helps explain the circular structure of much academic international legal debate: 
it aims to work through whatever it is that people think they observe. Those 
people then adopt a vocabulary that may, prima facie, seem to suit their 
observations, only to discover that actually, it is not all that suitable, or that it 
comes with loads of normative baggage that no one anticipated at the time, or 
even that the initial observations were not all that accurate really.  
So too with international constitutionalism. It kicked off in earnest, arguably, 
once Tully had compellingly suggested that constitutions could co-exist.49 
Thereafter, people started to think that international and domestic 
constitutionalism were not mutually exclusive, and that, lo and behold, some 
international phenomena could perhaps be explained with the help of a 
constitutional vocabulary - how else to make sense of jus cogens? Or erga omnes 
obligations? It is no coincidence that traditional international lawyers, raised on 
a diet of sovereignty and state consent, were abhorred by these notions, but the 
new Latin terms seemed amenable to a constitutional discourse, and once such a 
dicourse was adopted, they seemed to pop up everywhere; which in turn created 
doubts about the accuracy  or usefulness of the observation: if all norms are jus 
cogens, then the concept does little specific work. Moreover, once it was realized 
that constitutionalism comes with normative connotations, the question quickly 
arose whether it was needed in the wake of the seeming retreat of globalization 
and the pragmatic way to solve fragmentation, or whether it was even desirable: 
classic fears about world government could come to the fore, for it seemed that 
global constitutionalism was only one step removed from such a spectre. 
As a result, the debate died down about as quickly as it had arisen. It dominated 
the discipline for about a decade, and then fizzed out. Still, some of the 
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underlying issues are persistent. There is a movement towards global law50, 
including through overlapping legal spaces. There is the need to provide for 
public and common goods, made crystal clear by climate change, and for this, the 
traditional existence on sovereignty and state consent seems insufficient, 
outdated, probably even dangerous. In one form or another then, some of the 
thoughts underlying constitutionalization are bound to persist or, perhaps, 
return. 
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